Case-level analysis of every documented transgender homicide in the United States, 2015–2024. All data independently verified through court records and local news coverage.
The Human Rights Campaign has published annual reports documenting transgender people killed in America since 2015. Their data is the foundation of this study. But HRC never reported who was actually committing the killings, and nearly every institution that cited their data attributed the violence to White supremacy and societal transphobia. HRC itself attributed the deaths of “our Black trans siblings” to “an epidemic of violence” fueled by “systems of white supremacy” in June 2020, the same year this study found zero White suspects identified. This study took HRC’s victim lists and did what HRC never did: independently verified every case from 2015 to 2024 against court records, news coverage, and police statements to identify the perpetrators (N = 304 victims; 186 identified suspects). The findings are the categorical opposite of the narrative.
This study analyzed all 304 cases of fatal violence against transgender individuals documented by the Human Rights Campaign from 2015 to 2024 and produced the following findings:
Since 2013, the Human Rights Campaign Foundation has published annual reports titled “An Epidemic of Violence,” documenting fatal violence against transgender people in the United States. These reports became the authoritative source behind presidential proclamations, congressional resolutions, AMA declarations, and celebrity open letters, all framing the violence as a product of societal transphobia, legislative hostility, and systemic racism. But HRC’s reports never examined the data at the case level. They do not report suspect demographics, code motive evidence, compare outcomes to national benchmarks, or test whether the patterns differ from general homicide dynamics. No other study has done so either. The entire institutional consensus was built on data that no one independently analyzed.
This study used HRC’s own victim lists as its source framework, then independently verified all 304 cases from 2015 to 2024 against court records, local news coverage, police statements, and autopsy reports. For each case, suspect demographics were identified, bias motivation was coded against a four-tier framework, circumstances were categorized, and case outcomes were tracked. The results are presented below.
The HRC Foundation report Black LGBTQ People and Compounding Discrimination (June 2021, page 2) specifically names four Black transgender women killed in January 2021 as evidence that White supremacy is driving the violence, citing “an epidemic of violence fueled by discrimination and bias.” This study independently verified every one of those cases through local news and court records. Here is what the evidence shows:
HRC published their report in June 2021. By that date, Brooks and McLaurin had already been arrested. The case facts were public record. HRC’s own memorial page for Fifty Bandz acknowledges she “was killed by someone she knew.” They knew who killed these women. They blamed White supremacy anyway.
On a building at 2013 Neighbors Alley in Midtown Sacramento, a public mural memorializes Chyna Gibson, a Black transgender performer shot ten times in a New Orleans parking lot in 2017. The right panel reads “Protect Our Trans Daughters.” The left reads “White Silence = Violence.” NOPD identified two Black men as persons of interest (not suspects, persons of interest) and explicitly stated there was “nothing demonstrating that this is a hate crime.” No white person has ever been connected to her death. In this dataset, Black suspects account for 123 of 189 identified perpetrators: 65.1%, nearly five times the Black share of the U.S. population. The mural does not name a suspect, mention intimate partner violence, or acknowledge any of this. It skips the data and proceeds directly to the narrative.
Consider the reverse. If white men were killing Black transgender women at over four times their population share and a mural appeared reading “Black Silence = Violence,” the building would not survive the week. The phrase would be catalogued as a hate crime. The artists would be investigated. The city would issue a public apology. Every institution cited in this study would mobilize against it. But when the actual perpetrators are disproportionately Black and the mural blames white people, no one objects. Not because no one knows, but because knowing would require confronting uncomfortable truths that no one in American public life is permitted to say out loud. Consider the world this creates: stating the opposite of the truth is considered brave, and it gets put on a wall. Stating the actual truth would get that same wall burned down and the person who said it investigated. That is the world you are living in.
The mural can be viewed on Google Street View at 2013 Neighbors Alley, Sacramento, California (image dated February 2025).
Malik Jackson was 21 years old. He worked at Five Guys in Tallahassee. His boss said he would arrive before the restaurant opened, sitting in the parking lot waiting for someone to unlock the door. He loved to fish. He loved to dance. His aunt described him simply: “Malik was a good kid. Malik didn’t get in any trouble. Malik smiled a lot.”
Tony McDade was a 38-year-old Black transgender man (biological female) released from a ten-year federal prison sentence for armed robbery four months earlier. He entered a relationship with Malik’s mother, Jennifer Jackson. According to the Jackson family and police records, McDade pistol-whipped Jennifer in her home and sent threatening texts including “I’ll kill for you and you.” Malik told McDade to leave and stop disrespecting his mother. On the morning of May 27, 2020, McDade posted a Facebook Live video threatening to kill five people. Shortly after, he walked to Jennifer’s home, where Malik was sitting in his car before work, and stabbed him in the neck. Malik died at the hospital. COVID-19 restrictions prevented his mother from entering the building, even as she begged to see him. McDade fled, pulled a gun on responding officers, and was shot and killed. A grand jury ruled the use of force justified.
Obama Foundation Town Hall, June 3, 2020 | “Reimagining Policing in the Wake of Continued Police Violence”
One week later, former President Barack Obama hosted an Obama Foundation town hall titled “Reimagining Policing in the Wake of Continued Police Violence.” He named Tony McDade alongside George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud Arbery as victims whose memory demanded a reimagining of American policing (verified by The Advocate). The remarks strongly suggest no one at the Obama Foundation verified the facts of the case. No one mentioned Malik Jackson. His mother, who was not allowed to hold her dying son’s hand, watched a former president memorialize the man who killed him. The Jackson family’s attorneys responded publicly: “We believe that if President Obama knew exactly what happened on May 26th and May 27th, he would not have made those statements. And we believe an apology should be stated to the family of Malik Jackson.” No apology was ever issued.
When a local activist was asked whether McDade’s actions should factor into the public response, she answered: “It doesn’t matter what he did.” Malik Jackson’s aunt offered a different view: “Malik Jackson’s life mattered too.”
Malik Jackson is not in this dataset. He was not transgender. He was a 21-year-old Black man who went to work every day and loved to fish and was murdered by someone the police had been called about the night before. His name was never read on a debate stage. No president said his name. No mural was painted. The institutional consensus had no use for Malik Jackson, because his death did not serve the narrative. He was the wrong kind of victim, killed by the wrong kind of person, in the wrong kind of story. So they said the name of the person who killed him instead, and they called it justice.
This study contains two distinct layers.
The empirical layer (Sections I–V, VIII) consists of independent case-level data collection, verification against primary sources, demographic coding, bias motive classification, and benchmarking against national data. Every data point is sourced, every methodology decision documented, every limitation stated.
The responsive layer (Sections VI–VII, Objections, case studies) exists because specific, testable claims by named institutions, HRC, the AMA, elected officials, were built on this dataset but never tested at the case level. These are factual claims with policy consequences, and they are contradicted by the data. The responsive sections test those claims against the evidence using the same dataset and sourcing standards.
Research on fatal violence against transgender people in the United States has been limited by data availability. Key prior contributions include:
No prior study has independently verified HRC’s victim lists against primary sources to produce a case-level dataset with suspect demographics, bias motive coding, circumstance categorization, and case outcomes across a full decade. This study uses HRC’s lists as the source framework but rejects their interpretive framing in favor of independent case-level analysis.
For over a decade, the institutional narrative has attributed this violence to White supremacy, societal transphobia, and legislative hostility. This framing has been advanced simultaneously by presidents, Congress, the AMA, major LGBTQ organizations, Hollywood, and peer-reviewed scholarship. This dataset shows it is empirically wrong. The following is a representative catalogue:
The pattern is unmistakable and total. Across every sector of American institutional life, from the President of the United States to the nation’s largest medical association, from U.S. Senators running for president to the first transgender member of Congress, from Emmy-winning actresses to Oscar-nominated actors, from showrunners with Netflix deals to peer-reviewed academic journals, from open letters signed by hundreds of celebrities to formal theories published in the British Journal of Sociology, from GLAAD to the AMA to the halls of Congress itself, the unanimous framing attributes this violence to White supremacy, societal transphobia, legislative hostility, and a culture that “demeans anyone who dares challenge the gender binary.” The framing is so total that it has become the only acceptable lens through which to discuss these deaths. It operates across entertainment, politics, medicine, academia, journalism, and social media advocacy as a single, unified, unquestioned narrative. Not one of these statements, across a full decade of annual reports, presidential proclamations, Senate floor speeches, debate performances, celebrity open letters, academic monographs, press releases, essays, and television storylines, has ever mentioned the demographic identity of the people actually committing these homicides.
Source Framework: The Human Rights Campaign’s annual reports on fatal violence against transgender and gender-non-conforming people (2015–2024) were used as the victim identification framework. Each named victim was independently verified against local news coverage, court records, and law enforcement statements. The ten annual HRC source reports used in this study are linked below:
Study Period: 2015–2024, covering the complete span of HRC’s published annual victim reports. 2015 is the first year HRC published individual victim identifications; the author could not locate named victim lists for 2013–2014, making case-level verification impossible for those years.
Independent Verification: For each case, the researcher located primary source documentation (news reports, police press releases, court dockets, autopsy information where available) to verify victim identity, manner of death, suspect identity, case status, and documented circumstances. HRC’s own characterizations, bias assessments, and narrative framing were not used as data inputs.
Coding Framework:
Suspect Race/Ethnicity: Coded from mugshots, court records, news photography, and law enforcement physical descriptions. Categories: Black, White, Hispanic, Asian/Other, Unknown. Two suspects in 2015 and one in 2016 were coded under two racial categories (Hispanic and White, or Black and Hispanic) because their ethnicity could not be reduced to a single group; they are counted once in each applicable category, yielding 189 racial classifications across 186 unique suspects.
Anti-Trans Bias Motive: Four-tier coding: Confirmed (hate crime charges filed or explicit law enforcement statement), Suspected (evidence of animus without formal charges), No Evidence (documented alternative motive), Unknown (insufficient information). HRC bias assessments were not used.
Case Status: Coded as Solved (arrest, conviction, or guilty plea), Unsolved (no suspect identified), or Pending (charges filed, awaiting trial). Solve rates are calculated as (cases with at least one identified suspect) divided by (total victims in that year), including police-involved cases in the denominator. This produces slightly more conservative solve rate figures than excluding police cases from the denominator.
Circumstances: Independently categorized from primary source documentation: intimate partner/domestic/family violence, sex work encounter, dispute/argument, robbery/theft, discovery/panic, drug-related, serial killing, police-involved, concealment of relationship, random/stranger, in custody, incidental, or unknown/unsolved.
All case data is derived from publicly accessible sources. Any researcher with access to court records, local news archives, and law enforcement statements can independently verify every data point in this study. The methodology is designed for full reproducibility.
Reliability and Verification: This study was conducted by a single researcher; formal inter-rater reliability testing was not performed. However, suspect race coding relied primarily on mugshots and booking photographs rather than subjective assessment. Bias motive coding was designed to minimize subjectivity: “Confirmed” requires formal hate crime charges, “No Evidence” requires documented alternative motives. The subjective element is concentrated in “Suspected” (11.3% of coded cases); the modal category “Unknown” (56%) reflects absence of information, not a coding judgment. All underlying case data is publicly available for independent verification.
Sample Characterization: HRC victim lists constitute a purposive sample from media monitoring and community reporting, the most comprehensive available system, used in multiple peer-reviewed studies (Dinno 2017; Halliwell et al. 2025). It is not a probability sample: urban cases are overrepresented, and victims misgendered by police may be underrepresented in earlier years. Rate calculations should be interpreted as minimum floors.
Ethical Review: This study analyzes exclusively publicly available data (news articles, court records, law enforcement press releases). All victims are deceased; research involving deceased persons generally falls outside human subjects regulations (45 CFR 46). Analysis of publicly available information about living suspects is exempt under 45 CFR 46.104(d)(4)(i). This study was conducted by an independent researcher; formal IRB review was not available.
Following case-by-case verification of all 304 cases across all ten year files (2015–2024), the following corrections and annotations were applied:
Victim Race Corrections: Savannah Ryan Williams (2023) race corrected from Black to Native American/Cuban; classified as Unknown for statistical purposes because she cannot be assigned to a single racial category (sources: HRC, NBC, Star Tribune). Sasha Williams (2024) race corrected from Black to Unknown/Multiracial; HRC and victim’s best friend confirmed multiracial self-identification, but specific racial components could not be verified; classified as Unknown for statistical purposes. Jazlynn Johnson (2024) race not confirmed in available sources; classified as Unknown. These corrections yield 304 victim racial classifications with three victims of unknown race.
Suspect Race Verification: Hassan Malik Howard (2024, Sasha Williams case) race confirmed as Black via CCDC booking photo published by the Las Vegas Sun (Jan. 27, 2024). Howard was found incompetent to stand trial by two doctors; remains jailed without bond. No changes to aggregate suspect counts (123 Black, 34 White, 31 Hispanic, 1 Asian/Other = 189 racial classifications from 186 unique suspects).
Banko Brown (2023) Reclassification: Reclassified from police-involved killing to security guard shooting. Banko Brown was shot by a Walgreens security guard, not a police officer. The DA ruled the shooting self-defense and filed no charges. The security guard is excluded from suspect demographics, consistent with the exclusion applied to police-involved cases.
Non-Homicide and Vehicular Cases Retained with Annotation: Several cases included in HRC’s victim lists were vehicular deaths or deaths not officially ruled homicide. These are retained in the dataset because HRC listed them, but annotated in the individual year files: Codii Lawrence (2023, vehicle), Charm Wilson (2023, vehicle), YOKO (2023, vehicle, nonbinary), Kita Bee (2024, vehicular hit-and-run), Honee Daniels (2024, vehicular offense), San Coleman (2024, death not officially ruled homicide).
Disputed or Contested Identity Cases: Several individuals included in HRC’s lists have disputed or contested transgender identity based on conflicting source information. These are retained in the dataset because HRC listed them, but annotated: Thomas Robertson (2023), Kejuan Richardson (2023), Dominic DuPree (2023), Alexa Sokova (2023, friend stated “recently detransitioned”), San Coleman (2024, some sources use male pronouns and birth name). Nonbinary identity noted for: Tortuguita (2023), YOKO (2023), River Nevaeh Goddard (2024).
Included: All individuals listed by name in HRC’s annual fatal violence reports for the years 2015–2024. Excluded: Individuals listed by HRC whose deaths were subsequently determined by medical examiners to be non-homicide (e.g., drug overdose, medical emergency). Two such cases were identified and excluded from all bias motive analysis, yielding N = 301 for bias coding and N = 304 for all other analyses.
This study’s findings are compared below to the three primary national data sources on homicide demographics:
FBI SHR: In 2019, 55.9% of known-race homicide offenders were Black. ~91% of Black victims were killed by Black offenders, and ~81% of White victims by White offenders. This study’s ~80% intraracial rate mirrors the FBI’s national figure.
BJS: NCVS and BJS reports confirm most violent crime is intraracial. Approximately 34% of female murder victims are killed by intimate partners (BJS 2021); CDC/NVDRS found 55.3% of female homicides involved IPV when circumstances were known (Petrosky et al. 2017). Across all homicides regardless of sex, ~20%.
CDC: CDC mortality data confirms Black homicide rates are 6–8× those of White Americans. This study’s victim disproportionality (5.06×) falls within the same range.
Across every metric, this study’s findings are consistent with national homicide patterns. The racial demographics, intraracial rates, motive distributions, and clearance rates do not represent an anomalous phenomenon.
A chi-square goodness-of-fit test was conducted to determine whether the racial distribution of identified suspects differs significantly from what would be expected based on U.S. population shares (ACS 2020–2023 estimates).
| Race | Observed (N) | Expected (N) | O − E | (O−E)²/E |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Black | 123 | 25.7 | +97.3 | 368.29 |
| White | 34 | 112.1 | −78.1 | 54.39 |
| Hispanic | 31 | 36.1 | −5.1 | 0.72 |
| Asian/Other | 1 | 15.1 | −14.1 | 13.19 |
Cramér’s V = 0.88 (large effect). Cohen (1988) defined effect size w thresholds of 0.10 (small), 0.30 (medium), and 0.50 (large). For this four-category goodness-of-fit test, the corresponding w = 1.52, more than triple the “large” threshold. The observed racial disparity is not merely statistically significant; it is substantively enormous.
Contextualizing the Chi-Square Finding: The comparison to population shares confirms the suspect pool is not representative, a finding also true of general homicide nationally. The more informative question is whether the distribution differs from what victim demographics and intraracial rates predict.
FBI Expanded Homicide Data Table 6 (2019, single-victim/single-offender cases with known-race offenders) shows that 90.5% of Black homicide victims were killed by Black offenders, 17.6% of White victims were killed by Black offenders, and 16.2% of Other-race victims were killed by Black offenders. Applying these rates to this study’s victim demographics (68.8% Black, 14.1% White, 17.1% Hispanic/Other):
Expected P(Black suspect) = (0.688 × 0.905) + (0.141 × 0.176) + (0.171 × 0.162) = 0.623 + 0.025 + 0.028 = 67.6%
The observed Black suspect rate of 65.1% falls below this demographic prediction, suggesting the suspect demographics are explained by victim demographics and intraracial violence patterns, not by any transgender-specific racial dynamic. Caveats: FBI Table 6 covers only single-victim/single-offender homicides (~51% of all); Hispanic victims are approximated using the “Other” cross-racial rate; and the assumption that national patterns apply to this population is untested.
| Race | Observed % | 95% CI | Population % | Overlap? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Black | 65.1% | 57.8% – 71.9% | 13.6% | No |
| White | 18.0% | 12.8% – 24.2% | 59.3% | No |
| Hispanic | 16.4% | 11.4% – 22.5% | 19.1% | Yes |
| Asian/Other | 0.5% | 0.0% – 2.9% | 8.0% | No |
Interpretation: The Black suspect CI (57.8%–71.9%) does not approach the Black population share (13.6%); even the lower bound is 4× the population share. The White suspect upper bound (24.2%) is less than half the White population share. Only Hispanic overlaps with population parity.
The institutional consensus frames this violence as a hate crime epidemic driven by White supremacy and legislative hostility. This dataset shows the opposite: the predominant pattern is Black men killing Black transgender women (biological males) in the context of intimate relationships and sexual encounters. This is intraracial interpersonal violence statistically indistinguishable from American homicide broadly. Misdiagnosing a problem guarantees the failure of every intervention built on that diagnosis. Intimate partner violence is the #1 identified circumstance. Transgender-specific domestic violence services, emergency housing, and safety planning are likely to prevent more deaths than additional hate crime legislation.
The organizations and officials who shaped public understanding of this violence did not leave ambiguity about what they believed was causing it. These are their own words, from their own publications, press releases, and official statements.
2020 was the year nearly every major institution converged on White supremacy as the explanation for anti-transgender violence. Here is what the data actually shows:
Zero. In the year the entire institutional apparatus declared White supremacy was killing transgender people, not a single White suspect was identified. The pattern holds across all ten years: White suspects account for 18.0%, less than one-third their population share. The institutional refusal to examine suspect demographics is not a gap in analysis. It is the precondition for the narrative.
Ten police-involved killings and two security guard shootings in ten years (3.9% of all cases). Every single one was ruled justified or resulted in no charges, and in every police case the decedent was armed and attacking someone. Weapons included knives (5), firearms (2), and improvised weapons (3). Three were classified as “suicide by cop.” The most prominent case, Tony McDade (examined in the case study above), was a murder suspect who pointed a firearm at an officer, then was named by a president as a victim of police violence. The claim that transgender people are “disproportionately impacted by police violence” is empirically false.
At 61% average clearance, these cases are solved at rates comparable to or above the national average, contradicting claims of systemic law enforcement neglect. Effective prevention requires addressing the structural conditions (poverty, housing instability, survival sex work) driving this violence. Accurate data is the precondition.
Advocacy organizations serve a vital role in drawing attention to violence against marginalized communities. But when advocacy framing departs from evidence (presuming all deaths are hate-motivated, eliding suspect demographics, claiming systemic law enforcement failure) it undermines credibility and misdirects resources. The most effective advocacy is grounded in accurate data. This study demonstrates that rigorous, case-level analysis can coexist with genuine concern for the safety of transgender people.
Dinno (2017) is the only peer-reviewed study that estimated transgender homicide rates, published in the American Journal of Public Health and cited by virtually every institution in this study’s Literature Review. Dinno reported a rate of 95.1 per 100,000 for young Black biological males living as women and compared it to Black non-transgender women (40.9), producing a 2.3× multiplier cited as evidence of crisis. But these victims are biological males. Dinno’s own paper reports the rate for Black non-transgender men aged 15–34: 367 per 100,000. The rate for biological males living as women is one quarter of the male baseline (one third using this study’s 2015–2024 data, which includes the 2020–2021 national homicide surge), not elevated above it. To our knowledge, every institution that cited Dinno cited the female comparison. None cited the male comparison.
The rate for young Black biological males living as women (95.1 per 100,000) represents a fundamentally different violence profile than that of young Black non-transgender men (367 per 100,000). Sex work encounters appear among the top identified circumstances in this dataset; research consistently documents that transgender women, particularly Black transgender women, engage in survival sex work at substantially higher rates due to employment discrimination and economic exclusion (Gruberg et al. 2021). Higher exposure to sex work means higher exposure to the situational violence that accompanies it. Intimate partner dynamics involving relationship concealment create a second risk factor with no non-transgender parallel: multiple cases involve partners who reacted violently when the relationship became known. This is interpersonal violence driven by concealment and shame, not the “societal transphobia” described in institutional framing.
A note on Dinno’s source data. Dinno used unverified community-submitted lists (TDOR, NCAVP), not court records. Even Rebecca Stotzer, whose editorial accompanied Dinno’s paper in the AJPH, cautioned that these “data sources hinder our understanding of transgender murders” and called Dinno’s claim that transgender people successfully avoid being murdered “dubious.” This study is the further research Stotzer called for.
Black suspects are the majority in every single year from 2015 to 2024, ranging from 53% to 79%. Ten years, hundreds of independent police departments, prosecutors, and judges:
| Year | Black | White | Hispanic | Asian/Other | Total | Black % | White % | Hispanic % | Asian/Other % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | 8 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 15 | 53% | 13% | 33% | 0% |
| 2016 | 15 | 7 | 2 | 0 | 24 | 63% | 29% | 8% | 0% |
| 2017 | 10 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 16 | 63% | 25% | 6% | 6% |
| 2018 | 7 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 13 | 54% | 23% | 23% | 0% |
| 2019 | 11 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 79% | 14% | 7% | 0% |
| 2020 | 16 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 22 | 73% | 0% | 27% | 0% |
| 2021 | 21 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 29 | 72% | 14% | 14% | 0% |
| 2022 | 14 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 22 | 64% | 23% | 14% | 0% |
| 2023 | 11 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 19 | 58% | 26% | 16% | 0% |
| 2024 | 10 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 15 | 67% | 13% | 20% | 0% |
| Total | 123 | 34 | 31 | 1 | 189 | 65% | 18% | 16% | 1% |
How does this compare to national homicide? The FBI’s Expanded Homicide Data Table 3 publishes murder offenders by race annually. Below is every year of published data that overlaps with this study (2015–2019, from the UCR Summary Reporting System). After 2019, the FBI transitioned to the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) and discontinued the traditional offender-by-race tables. The NIBRS data is available through the FBI’s Crime Data Explorer but is not directly comparable: agency coverage collapsed to ~65% in 2021, and the format changed substantially. For methodological consistency, only the 2015–2019 UCR data is presented here.
| Year | FBI National (Expanded Homicide Data Table 3) | This Study (T-CLEAR) | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Black % | White %* | Other % | Hispanic† | Ethnicity Unknown | Black % | White % | Hispanic % | |
| 2015 | 53.3% | 44.0% | 2.7% | 1,312 | 42.7% | 53% | 13% | 33% |
| 2016 | 53.5% | 43.9% | 2.6% | 1,533 | 43.4% | 61% | 30% | 4% |
| 2017 | 54.2% | 43.1% | 2.6% | 1,505 | 40.7% | 63% | 25% | 6% |
| 2018 | 54.9% | 42.4% | 2.7% | 1,576 | 52.4% | 54% | 23% | 23% |
| 2019 | 55.9% | 41.1% | 3.0% | 1,531 | 52.8% | 79% | 14% | 7% |
FBI source: Expanded Homicide Data Table 3, 2015–2019. *FBI “White” includes Hispanic/Latino individuals (see note below). †Hispanic count reflects only agencies that reported ethnicity; “Ethnicity Unknown” shows the percentage of all offenders for whom ethnicity was not reported. By 2019, more than half of all offenders had unknown ethnicity, meaning the Hispanic count captures only a fraction of actual Hispanic offenders.
This is not what arrest bias looks like. It is what national intraracial homicide data looks like: 91% of Black homicide victims are killed by Black offenders (FBI, Expanded Homicide Data Table 6, 2019). Beyond that: case files document at least 120 convictions and guilty pleas, including 56 guilty pleas, 28 life sentences or LWOP, 10 confessions corroborated by physical evidence, and 34 cases with surveillance video.
The objection: FBI arrest data reflects racially biased policing, not actual offending. Response: examine a state where the data is collected under exclusively Democratic Attorneys General, the most left-leaning major state in the country, for 25 years.
The California Department of Justice publishes annual “Crime in California” reports containing Table 31: Felony Arrests by Race/Ethnic Group. This data covers every law enforcement agency in the state. From 2000 to 2024, every single Attorney General who oversaw this data collection was a Democrat:
| Attorney General | Party | Years | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bill Lockyer | Democratic | 1999–2007 | Former State Senate President Pro Tem |
| Jerry Brown | Democratic | 2007–2011 | Later served as Governor (2011–2019) |
| Kamala Harris | Democratic | 2011–2017 | Later served as U.S. Vice President (2021–2025) |
| Xavier Becerra | Democratic | 2017–2021 | Later served as HHS Secretary |
| Rob Bonta | Democratic | 2021–present | First Filipino-American state AG in U.S. history |
The 24-year average arrest shares compared to California’s population shares:
Below is 24 years of homicide arrest data from the California Attorney General’s annual reports (2001 excluded; the AG’s office published duplicate 2002 data for that year). Hispanic individuals lead homicide arrests in every single year, 24 for 24, followed by Black, then White, then Other. This is California, not Mississippi.
Below is Table 31 from the 2024 California Attorney General’s “Crime in California” report. The homicide row shows 629 Hispanic, 389 Black, 212 White, and 75 Other felony arrests. Click to view the full report.
Source: California Department of Justice, “Crime in California 2024,” Table 31. Click image to open full report (PDF).
The New York City Police Department publishes annual Crime and Enforcement Activity Reports that do what the FBI does not: separate Black Non-Hispanic, White Non-Hispanic, and Hispanic into distinct categories. This is the dataset that reveals what the FBI's “White” column actually contains when you pull Hispanic offenders out of it.
New York City’s population (2023 ACS): 31.0% White Non-Hispanic, 20.3% Black Non-Hispanic, 28.4% Hispanic, 14.9% Asian/Pacific Islander. As of December 31, 2024, the NYPD’s uniformed force is 39.2% White, 16.6% Black, 32.6% Hispanic, and 11.4% Asian. The combined Black and Hispanic share of uniformed officers (49.2%) essentially matches the combined Black and Hispanic share of the city’s population (48.7%). This is not a White police force arresting minorities. This is a representative police force producing the same data.
Shooting arrestees (2024) are even more extreme: Black 64.4%, Hispanic 32.3%, White 1.0%, Asian/Pacific Islander 2.2%. One percent. From 31% of the population. Black and Hispanic combined account for 96.7% of all shooting arrests in New York City.
The National Crime Victimization Survey, administered by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the U.S. Census Bureau, surveys over 200,000 people annually. For each violent victimization, the survey asks the victim to identify the perceived race and ethnicity of the offender. No police are involved. No arrests are made. No prosecutors exercise discretion. The victim simply describes who attacked them.
If the “biased policing” objection were correct, and arrest demographics were manufactured by racially biased law enforcement rather than reflecting actual offending, then victim-reported offender demographics should look dramatically different from arrest demographics. They do not.
| Race/Ethnicity | Perceived Offender % | U.S. Population % | Multiplier |
|---|---|---|---|
| White | 53.7% | 60.2% | 0.89× |
| Black | 24.0% | 12.2% | ~2.0× |
| Hispanic | 14.0% | 18.3% | 0.77× |
| Asian/NHOPI | 1.3% | 7.1% | 0.18× |
The NCVS also confirms the intraracial pattern from a victim-reported source. In 2023, Black victims reported Black offenders in approximately 487,000 incidents and White offenders in approximately 118,000. White victims reported White offenders in approximately 1.95 million incidents and Black offenders in approximately 385,400. The same intraracial violence pattern documented throughout this study, confirmed by the people who experienced the violence firsthand.
55% of murder exonerations are Black (National Registry of Exonerations). This sounds alarming until you measure it against the offending base: 19 Black murder exonerations per year out of 6,425 Black homicide offenders identified annually. The NRE documented 1,167 murder exonerations from 1989 to 2022 (35/year: 19 Black, 11 White). Black exoneration rate: 0.30%. White: 0.23%. Nearly identical.
Source: National Registry of Exonerations, “Race and Wrongful Convictions in the United States 2022” (University of Michigan Law School, Michigan State University, UC Irvine).
Measured against the offending base, the exoneration rates are nearly identical:
A 99.7% accuracy rate. The reason 55% of murder exonerations are Black is that 55.9% of known murder offenders are Black. More cases in, more exonerations out.
A common rebuttal to any discussion of Black overrepresentation in offending data is to redirect to police violence: the claim that police kill thousands or even tens of thousands of unarmed Black people annually. This is not a strawman. The Skeptic Research Center (McCaffree & Saide, 2021; N = 980 U.S. adults) asked respondents: “If you had to guess, how many unarmed Black men were killed by police in 2019?” The results:
Source: McCaffree, K. & Saide, A. (2021). “How Informed are Americans about Race and Policing?” Skeptic Research Center, CUPES-007. N = 980 U.S. adults surveyed September/October 2020.
More than half of “very liberal” respondents believed 1,000 or more unarmed Black men were killed by police in a single year. More than one in five believed the number was 10,000 or higher. The researchers described this as “a likely error of at least an order of magnitude.” The actual number, according to the Washington Post Fatal Force database (described by Nature as the “most complete database” on police shootings): 13 unarmed Black men were fatally shot by police in 2019. This study uses the same database across the identical 2015–2024 window:
Over 10 years, the Washington Post documented 523 unarmed fatal police shootings across all races (52.3/year). Unarmed Black individuals: 18 per year, not 10,000. The per-capita overrepresentation (Black: ~13.6% of population, ~34.4% of unarmed fatalities) is real but is substantially explained by disproportionate involvement in violent crime. When a group accounts for 55.9% of known homicide offenders and is correspondingly overrepresented in armed confrontations, a higher rate of unarmed shooting fatalities is a statistical expectation, not evidence of independent racial targeting. This does not excuse any individual unjustified shooting. It explains the aggregate pattern.
This study documented 10 police-involved killings and 2 security guard shootings of transgender individuals over the entire 10-year period (2015–2024). In every single case, the individual killed was armed. Zero unarmed transgender people were killed by police or security guards in this dataset.
| Metric | General Pop. (WaPo) | T-CLEAR (This Study) |
|---|---|---|
| Total police killings, 2015–2024 | ~10,000 | 12 |
| Unarmed subjects killed | 523 (~5%) | 0 (0%) |
| Armed subjects killed | ~9,477 (~95%) | 12 (100%) |
| Ruled justified / no charges | Varies | 12 of 12 (100%) |
In the general population, ~5% of people fatally shot by police are unarmed. In this dataset: 0%. Every case was ruled justified or resulted in no charges.
Of 304 victims, 186 have an identified suspect with known race. The remaining 118 are unsolved. Worst case: assign every unsolved case to a White perpetrator. Result: Black suspects at 123 of 304 = 40.5%, still 3.0× their 13.6% population share. White suspects would rise to 50%, still below their 59.3% population share. Expected case: applying national intraracial rates to the ~70% Black unsolved victim pool would add ~74 Black suspects, producing 64%, identical to the solved rate.
Grant this objection entirely. Reclassify all 41 “Suspected” bias cases as confirmed, producing a maximum of 52 bias-motivated homicides over ten years. Even under this most expansive bias classification, 85% of cases (259 of 304) would still not be bias-motivated, and the dominant circumstances (intimate partner violence, sex work encounters, interpersonal disputes) remain unchanged. The crude overall transgender homicide rate under this scenario (~1.9 per 100,000) remains below the CDC general population average (~6.8 per 100,000), though this comparison has significant limitations (see “Replicating Dinno” above for full rate analysis and why the cross-sex comparison that produced the “epidemic” framing is misleading).
A note on framing: This study does not minimize the gravity of any homicide triggered by discovery of a victim’s transgender status. But a methodological question arises: is a reactive killing during an intimate encounter analytically identical to a premeditated attack motivated by abstract hatred? The “trans panic” framing treats these as equivalent. The distinction matters for accurate motive coding: collapsing it inflates the hate crime count and misdirects prevention efforts away from the interpersonal contexts where the violence actually occurs.
Grant this objection and model it. Of 301 coded cases, 166 were coded Unknown. The remaining 135 break down as: 10 Confirmed (3.3%), 42 Suspected (13.9%), and 83 No Evidence (27.5%).
Conservative scenario: If the Unknown cases contain bias at the same rate as known-motive cases (10 of 135 = 7.4%), the total confirmed bias cases would be approximately 22 of 301 (7.4%). Liberal scenario: If Unknown cases contain bias at double the known rate (14.8%), the total would be approximately 35 of 301 (11.6%). Extreme scenario: If every Suspected and Unknown case involved bias, the maximum would be 219 of 301 (72.5%).
Even under the liberal scenario, intimate partner violence, disputes, robbery, and sex work encounters would still constitute the majority of cases with documented motives. The 3.3% confirmed figure is a floor, not a ceiling, and this study does not claim that anti-transgender bias is absent from the dataset. It claims that confirmed bias is rare, that the data do not support a default presumption of bias motivation, and that the leading documented circumstances mirror general homicide patterns. These claims hold under all but the most extreme assumptions about the Unknown category.
Harvard economist Raj Chetty and colleagues tracked 20 million children linked to their parents using de-identified Census and IRS data, measuring incarceration rates on April 1, 2010 (ages 27–32) across the full income spectrum by race and gender. The results directly contradict the poverty explanation.
A Black man born to parents earning $1.1 million a year has the same chance of being incarcerated on a given day as a White man born to parents earning $36,000 a year. The disparity does not shrink with wealth. It widens: from 3.3× at the bottom to 10× among the wealthiest families (2.24% vs. 0.21%). The poverty explanation requires poverty to exist. For families earning over a million dollars a year, it does not.
If the disparity were caused by poverty, systemic racism, or police bias, the gap should appear for Black women too. They grow up in the same households, same neighborhoods, face the same police. The gap vanishes. Black and White women have nearly identical incarceration rates at every income level. The disparity is specific to Black men, and police bias cannot be gender-selective.
The NCVS victim-reported offender data in Objection 2 independently confirms this: victims identify their attacker’s race without police involvement, and those descriptions match arrest statistics.
Chetty found two factors associated with smaller gaps: higher Black father presence at the neighborhood level (uncorrelated with Black girls’ or White boys’ outcomes, suggesting a role-model mechanism), and lower racial bias among White residents. Fewer than 5% of Black children grow up in areas with both. 63% of White children do.
“One in five black men born to a low-income family is incarcerated on a given day, which is just an astonishingly high rate. You don’t see anything like that for both black and white women.” — Raj Chetty, Harvard University
The objection: Disproportionate Black homicide rates are a downstream consequence of American slavery, Jim Crow, and redlining. If true, this generates a testable prediction: countries whose Black populations have no connection to American slavery should show significantly different patterns. They don’t.
Canada and the United Kingdom provide a natural experiment: jurisdictions where the Black population exists under entirely different historical conditions, yet government-published crime data is available. If the American experience is the causal variable, removing it should change the outcome.
Canada’s Black population is 1.5 million (4.3% of total). Critically, 59% are first-generation immigrants (Caribbean and African), 32.4% are second-generation, and only 8.6% are third-generation or more. The overwhelming majority arrived voluntarily, with no connection to American slavery, Jim Crow, or redlining. Canada’s own slavery (approximately 4,200 people, abolished 1834) predates the modern Black Canadian population entirely.
Despite this entirely different historical trajectory, the Canadian government’s own data shows:
| Metric (2021) | Black | Non-Racialized* | Ratio |
|---|---|---|---|
| Population share | 4.3% | - | - |
| Homicide accused rate per 100K | 8.17 | 1.43 | 5.7× |
| Homicide victim rate per 100K | 7.72 | 1.81 | 4.3× |
| Share of homicide accused | 20% | - | 4.7× pop share |
*Statistics Canada defines “non-racialized” as persons who are not visible minorities and not Indigenous. This category is predominantly but not exclusively White Canadians. The exact White-only share of homicide accused is not published; the rate comparison (8.17 vs. 1.43 per 100K) is from Justice Canada. Sources: Justice Canada, “Overrepresentation of Black People in the Canadian Criminal Justice System”; Statistics Canada Table 35-10-0207-01; Statistics Canada, “Diversity of the Black Populations in Canada, 2021”
London’s Black population is approximately 13.5% of the city (White: ~53.8%, 2021 Census). This population is overwhelmingly post-1948 Windrush-era Caribbean immigrants and recent African immigrants. England had no domestic plantation slavery; the Somersett ruling of 1772 barred slavery on English soil.
From the official London Assembly press release (February 10, 2022), published on the Mayor of London’s government website:
| Metric | Black Londoners | White Londoners | Black Multiplier |
|---|---|---|---|
| Population share (2021 Census) | ~13% | ~54% | - |
| Knife murder perpetrators | 61% | - | 4.7× |
| Knife crime perpetrators | 53% | - | 4.1× |
| Knife murder victims | 45% | - | 3.5× |
Note: The London Assembly press release provides only Black shares of perpetrators and victims; a full racial breakdown for White Londoners was not published in the release. Underlying data may exist in the MQT workbook (2947_Knife Crime) but the White-specific percentages for all three categories could not be cleanly verified. The White population share (53.8%) is from the 2021 Census. Source: london.gov.uk – “Calls for a commission on knife crime in the black community” (10 Feb 2022). Motion agreed unanimously.
California entered the Union as a free state in 1850 with no legal slavery, no plantations, no Black Codes, no state-level Jim Crow. Yet as documented in Objection 2, the California AG’s data shows Black Californians arrested for homicide at 4.4 times their population share over 25 years under five consecutive Democratic AGs.
If California is the free-state control, Virginia is the Confederate control. Virginia was the capital of the Confederacy, the epicenter of American chattel slavery, and home to the largest enslaved population of any state at the start of the Civil War. If any jurisdiction in the United States should show a slavery-driven disproportionality pattern, it is Virginia. The Virginia State Police publish annual Crime in Virginia reports containing murder offender demographics by race.
If historical oppression is the causal mechanism, it should apply to all groups subjected to it. In California specifically, Chinese Americans faced legal discrimination that in several key respects was more severe than what Black Californians experienced during the same period:
| Right | Black Californians | Chinese Californians |
|---|---|---|
| Right to vote | ✓ 1870 (15th Amendment) | ✗ Barred until 1943 |
| Right to U.S. citizenship | ✓ 1868 (14th Amendment) | ✗ Barred until 1943 |
| Right to own land | ✓ No state prohibition | ✗ Barred 1913–1956 |
| Right to testify in court | ✓ Restored 1863 | ✗ Barred 1854–1873 |
| Right to immigrate | ✓ No federal ban | ✗ Banned 1882–1943 |
| CA homicide arrest rate (2000–2024) | 4.4× | 0.42× |
Under the “historical oppression causes crime” model, Asian Americans should show elevated rates. The opposite: despite more severe legal discrimination on every dimension, Asian/Other Californians have a homicide arrest rate of 0.42 times their population share vs. 4.4× for Black Californians. The oppression model predicts the reverse.
Five jurisdictions. Three countries. Five radically different histories with slavery and racial oppression. One pattern:
The range is 3.4× to 4.7×. Five jurisdictions, three countries, five radically different histories with racial oppression. The jurisdiction with the deepest connection to American slavery (Virginia) produces the lowest multiplier. A population that is 59% voluntary first-generation immigrants in Canada produces a higher multiplier than the descendants of enslaved people in the former capital of the Confederacy. A free state that never had slavery (California) produces a higher multiplier than a slave state that did. The pattern holds everywhere, but its magnitude does not correlate with slavery exposure.
The California, Virginia, and New York City data presented in Objections 2 and 9, side by side:
The claim: A viral video by Garrison Hayes (@garrisonh, 357K followers) argues that more White people are in prison than Black, citing Bureau of Prisons statistics showing “White” as the largest racial category in federal custody. The claim is wrong. The BOP publishes race and ethnicity on two separate pages, and the “White” count on the race page absorbs all Hispanic inmates into the White category. When you subtract Hispanic inmates using the BOP’s own ethnicity page, White Americans are the third-largest group in federal prison, not the first.
The Bureau of Prisons maintains two separate statistics pages. The Race page reports inmates as White, Black, Native American, or Asian. The Ethnicity page separately reports how many inmates are Hispanic. Because Hispanic is treated as an ethnicity and not a race, every Hispanic inmate is also counted as “White” (or another race) on the race page. Anyone who cites only the race page without adjusting for the ethnicity page is double-counting Hispanic inmates as White.
When you combine both BOP pages and properly separate Hispanic from White:
| Race/Ethnicity | Count | % of Federal Inmates | U.S. Population % | Rank |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Black | 58,680 | 38.4% | ~13% | #1 |
| Hispanic | 45,109 | 29.5% | ~19% | #2 |
| White (non-Hispanic) | ~41,915 | 27.4% | ~60% | #3 |
| Native American | 4,604 | 3.0% | ~1.3% | #4 |
| Asian | 2,472 | 1.6% | ~6% | #5 |
Source: Federal Bureau of Prisons, Inmate Race and Inmate Ethnicity pages. Data as of February 28, 2026. Total inmates: 152,780. Non-Hispanic White count derived by subtracting Hispanic count from BOP “White” race count (87,024 − 45,109 = 41,915).
The Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Prisoners in 2023 (published September 2025) reports race and ethnicity properly separated for all state and federal inmates combined. The BJS numbers confirm the same rank order:
| Federal Only (BOP, Feb 2026) | All Prisons: State + Federal (BJS, 2023) | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Race/Ethnicity | Share | Rank | Share | Rank |
| Black | 38.4% | #1 | 33% | #1 |
| Hispanic | 29.5% | #2 | 23% | #2 (federal) / #3 (combined) |
| White (non-Hispanic) | 27.4% | #3 | 31% | #3 (federal) / #2 (combined) |
| Native American | 3.0% | #4 | 2% | #4 |
| Asian/NHOPI | 1.6% | #5 | 1% | #5 |
Federal source: BOP Race and Ethnicity pages (Feb 28, 2026). All Prisons source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 2023 – Statistical Tables (NCJ 310197, September 2025). BJS properly separates Hispanic from White; “White” in BJS tables refers to non-Hispanic White.
This study has several important limitations that should be considered when interpreting the findings:
Unknown motive cases. Approximately 55% of coded cases were classified “Unknown” for bias motive, driven primarily by unsolved cases with no identified suspect or motive. The true motive distribution may differ from what solved cases suggest. If unsolved cases contain a higher proportion of bias-motivated killings (e.g., stranger attacks that are harder to solve), the 3.3% confirmed bias rate could underestimate the true prevalence.
Geographic gaps. Puerto Rico cases from 2015–2019 appear underrepresented in the dataset. Puerto Rico cases from 2020–2024, particularly federal hate crime prosecutions, are included.
Population denominator uncertainty. Disproportionality indices use ACS population share estimates. The transgender population is not enumerated by the Census, making rate-per-capita calculations subject to significant uncertainty. Different estimates (Williams Institute, Census surveys) yield different rates, though the direction and significance of findings are unaffected.
Missed and evolving cases. Media-based victim lists may miss cases receiving no public attention, biasing toward urban areas. Case outcomes can change after publication. The direction of these gaps is unknown.
Scale and data entry. At 304 cases, clerical errors are possible despite systematic review but expected to be minor and randomly distributed.
AI-assisted computation. Statistical analyses (chi-square testing, effect sizes, confidence intervals) and the Dinno (2017) replication were performed with AI assistance and have not yet been independently verified by a human statistician or subject-matter expert. The underlying case-level data is fully sourced and independently verifiable. These computational results should be treated as preliminary pending independent review.
This study independently verified all 304 cases of fatal violence against transgender people documented by the Human Rights Campaign from 2015 to 2024. The findings contradict the institutional consensus at every major point:
The suspect pool is not what the narrative claims. Black suspects account for 65.1% of identified perpetrators (χ² = 436.59, p < 0.001). White suspects account for 18.0%. In 2020, zero White suspects were identified. These are not hate crimes. Only 3.3% involved confirmed anti-transgender bias. The #1 circumstance is intimate partner violence. Law enforcement is not the problem. The 61% solve rate meets or exceeds national averages. Ten police-involved killings and two security guard shootings in ten years; every one ruled justified or resulted in no charges. The violence is intraracial and male-on-male. ~80% of solved cases involve same-race suspect-victim pairings. 90% of identified suspects are male; 92% of victims are biological males. This is biological males killing biological males within the same racial group: the single most common homicide pattern in the United States.
If the goal is to reduce deaths, not advance a narrative, the data identifies where to intervene: transgender-specific domestic violence services, emergency housing for trans individuals fleeing intimate partner violence, and community-based violence interruption programs targeting the intraracial dynamics this study documents, particularly in Black communities.
The institutions documented in this study diagnosed White supremacy without examining a single case file. This study examined every case and found the opposite. Intellectual honesty requires naming where the data points: intraracial intimate partner violence, concentrated in Black communities, following the same patterns that drive Black homicide nationally. The goal is not to stigmatize a community. It is to direct resources where people are actually dying.
The data also identifies a specific, preventable pattern: in at least 11 cases, lethal violence was triggered by the suspect's discovery of the victim's transgender identity during a sexual encounter. Policies that encourage pre-encounter disclosure while maintaining that violence is never a justified response could directly reduce deaths in this category.
The misdiagnosis was not merely rhetorical. It directed real money, real policy, and real institutional capacity toward a threat profile the data does not support, while the actual drivers of this violence received a fraction of the attention.
In June 2021, the Biden White House established the first Interagency Working Group on Safety, Inclusion, and Opportunity for Transgender Americans, spanning ten federal departments. The Working Group produced over 45 action items built around hate, stigma, and legislative hostility as the primary causes of anti-transgender violence. Not one identified intimate partner violence as the leading driver of these deaths.
The DOJ awarded over $90 million in hate crime grants between FY2021–2024 (covering all bias categories). The Office on Violence Against Women administered close to $1 billion per year in VAWA grants by FY2023–2024, with LGBTQI+-specific earmarks. Capital Research Center identified over $145 million in federal grants specifically directed to transgender-related initiatives since 2021. HRC operated on an annual budget of approximately $44.6 million and committed $15 million to Biden’s 2024 reelection effort.
The pattern replicated at the state level. California created the nation’s first dedicated Transgender, Gender Nonconforming, and Intersex Wellness and Equity Fund (AB 2521, $10.3 million) and has invested over $400 million since 2019 in anti-hate programs. New York created the Lorena Borjas Fund ($12.25 million) as part of a $33.5 million LGBTQ+ investment package. In every case, the political justification was the same narrative: transgender people are under attack from hate and legislative hostility. Not one program was framed around intimate partner violence as the leading circumstance, because no one had examined the data to discover it. This study reviewed only two states; the national picture is likely much larger.
Even HRC’s own 2024 report, buried beneath the “epidemic” framing, acknowledged that “many victims were killed by a friend, family, or romantic/sexual intimate partner.” The data was there. The interventions went elsewhere.
Sources: White House Fact Sheet, June 30, 2021; White House Fact Sheet, March 31, 2022; DOJ OJP FY2023 Hate Crime Awards; Capital Research Center, trans-specific federal grants; CA CDPH TGI Unit; NY Gov. Hochul LGBTQ+ Investment; HRC financial data. DOJ hate crime grants cover all bias categories. State LGBTQ+ packages serve broader LGBTQ+ communities, not only transgender people. Only two states were reviewed; national state-level totals are likely substantially higher. T-CLEAR data: this study (N=304, 2015–2024).
Every person and institution quoted in the Literature Review called for urgent action to protect transgender lives. They demanded legislation, funding, investigations, executive orders, and cultural change. They read victims’ names aloud on debate stages. They signed open letters. They passed resolutions. They declared states of emergency. The question this dataset forces is simple: would they still?
If Sen. Booker knew the people killing Black transgender women are overwhelmingly Black men, would he still blame White supremacy? If Rep. Jayapal knew only 3.3% have confirmed bias motivation, would she still declare a hate-driven “epidemic”? If the 465 celebrities who signed GLAAD’s open letter knew the #1 cause is intimate partner violence, would they still sign? If the AMA knew solve rates meet national averages, would they still lobby Congress about law enforcement failure? And if all of them knew these are biological males dying at rates nearly four times lower than young Black non-transgender men, that the “epidemic” was built on a cross-sex comparison while the male rate appeared in the same published paper: would any of them have said anything at all?
Perhaps some would. But the question answers itself for most: the institutional energy was never primarily about the victims. It was about the narrative. A narrative blaming White supremacy is politically useful from presidential campaigns to academic tenure files to organizations whose fundraising depends on the urgency of the threat they describe. A narrative pointing to Black intimate partners in patterns indistinguishable from general homicide is useful to no one’s political project and no one’s fundraising pitch. The narrative won. The data was never examined. The people who are actually dying were left without the interventions that might have saved them.
The institutional consensus did not fail because the data was unavailable. It failed because the data was inconvenient. The court records were always public. The FBI tables were always online. No one needed this study to find what this study found. They needed the willingness to say it out loud, and not one person in a position of institutional authority (not one researcher, not one journalist, not one politician, not one advocacy director) was willing to risk their career, their funding, or their social standing to state what a single afternoon with public records would have told them. The word for that is not ignorance. It is cowardice. The data is now public. The excuse is gone.
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In September 2023, while scrolling through X (formerly Twitter), I came across a reply buried in a thread I would normally have scrolled past. I was not following the user who posted it. It was a spreadsheet containing the suspect demographics for every case on the Human Rights Campaign’s 2020 list of transgender people killed in the United States. The post received two likes. The claim it contained was extraordinary: of all identified suspects in 2020 transgender homicides, zero were White.
I was in disbelief. The institutional narrative had been so total, so unanimous, that a finding of zero White suspects in the very year institutions most aggressively blamed White supremacy seemed impossible. I wanted to fact-check it. Not to prove it right or wrong, just to find out whether it was true.
I spent the next six months pulling every case from HRC’s 2020 list and independently verifying each one against court records, local news coverage, booking photos, and police statements. The data confirmed what the post had claimed. In 2020, among all identified suspects with known race, zero were White. Sixteen were Black. Six were Hispanic. Every single case I could verify matched. The tweet with two likes was correct.
I shared the verified 2020 findings with evolutionary biologist Dr. Colin Wright, who found the data interesting and said he would post it. I offered to go further: verify every year HRC had published, all the way back to 2015, and turn this into a full study. He said that was a great idea. So I did.
Building the full 10-year dataset (2015 to 2024, 304 victims) required AI assistance to manage the volume of case-level research: locating news articles, cross-referencing court records, identifying booking photos, and organizing hundreds of individual data points across a decade. I started using ChatGPT and other AIs during this process. That is where things got complicated.
I originally turned to AI tools because I needed help finding links to specific news articles, court records, and booking photos that I was not finding through direct searches. These tools are designed to assist with exactly this kind of research. But when I asked them to help me identify suspects in publicly documented homicide cases, or to locate demographic information from court records, the requests were repeatedly flagged and refused. The tools told me they could not assist with research that involved race and crime. They said the queries could perpetuate systemic racism. They treated the questions themselves, not any harmful application of them, as a category of harm to be prevented.
I am not a criminology student. I have no academic affiliation. I am an independent researcher who built this dataset using exclusively public records. But the only way I could get AI tools to assist with publicly available court records and news articles was to claim I was a doctoral criminology student at a local college. Once I said that, the same tools, processing the same queries about the same public records, cooperated without issue. The data did not change. The sources did not change. The questions did not change. The only thing that changed was a claimed credential, and that credential was the difference between access and refusal.
The filters were not protecting vulnerable people. The data behind the filters, once compiled, shows that the institutional narrative these tools were implicitly defending was empirically wrong, and that the misdiagnosis it produced had been misdirecting resources away from the intimate partner violence and emergency housing that the evidence says would actually save lives. The filters were not preventing harm. They were preventing the identification of harm.
Beyond the access restrictions, ChatGPT exhibited a consistent directional pattern in racial classification that made it unusable for this research. When asked to verify suspect race from booking photos and court records, the tool would not classify any suspect as Black, regardless of how unambiguous the source documentation was. However, it readily proposed reclassifications in the opposite direction: in multiple instances where this study had classified a suspect as Black based on booking photos and court records, ChatGPT suggested the suspect was actually White. When I checked each of these proposed corrections against the original source material, the suspects were, in fact, Black. The errors were not random. Every misclassification I identified moved in the same direction: away from Black and toward White. The tool never once reclassified a suspect of another race as Black. Whether this reflects an intentional design choice or an emergent property of the model’s training data, the practical result was the same: the output systematically undercounted Black suspects and overcounted White suspects, producing results less accurate than the original dataset. The tool was abandoned for classification purposes.
This study does not derive its validity from institutional authority. It derives its validity from its sources. Every victim is named. Every suspect is identified from public records. Every case links to primary source documentation: court records, news articles, booking photos, police statements. Every data point is independently verifiable by anyone with an internet connection. The methodology is transparent. The coding framework is documented. The limitations are stated. The standard this study asks to be judged by is not “who conducted it” but “is it accurate.” The answer to that question does not require a credential. It requires clicking the links.
The original post that started this project. A reply in a thread, two likes, and the data that no institution with unlimited resources had bothered to compile.
Dr. Colin Wright for encouraging the expansion from a single year of data into a full decade of research, and for the early support that made this project possible.
The Human Rights Campaign for publishing the victim lists that made this research possible. The names, locations, and dates in HRC’s annual reports are the foundation of every data point in this study. The disagreement documented here is not with HRC’s data collection, which is the most comprehensive available. It is with the interpretive framework applied to that data, a framework this study shows is not supported by case-level evidence.